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DENTAL THERAPISTS IN ALASKA:
ADDRESSING UNMET NEEDS AND
REVIVING COMPETITION IN
DENTAL CARE
ERIK BRUCE SMITH*
Dental healthcare is provided to Alaska Natives and all other
Native Americans by the United States government as part of its
unique legal and political relationship with the tribes. Although
Alaska Natives do have some degree of access to dentists, they
suffer from the worst dental health of any group in the United
States. This crisis exists because of geographic, cultural, and
economic constraints, and the dental profession has not acted
sufficiently to address these constraints. To deal with this crisis,
the federal government granted a special license for Dental
Therapists to provide much needed care to Natives. Dental
Therapists are a form of dental health professional somewhat
analogous to a nurse practitioner and are used in many developed
countries.
This Note discusses the economic and legal
foundations of professional regulation and explores the virtual
monopoly that dentists have on the provision of dental care. It
shows how Dental Therapists are a needed solution for addressing
the Native dental health crisis and how their introduction will
force the dental profession to more seriously address the
nationwide need for enhanced access and availability of low-cost
care for underserved populations.

I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, healthcare regulation is largely
dominated by dentists and doctors via the American Dental
Association (ADA) and American Medical Association. In fact,
the control of these professionals over their own licensure is
unparalleled in any other economic sector in the United States.
The fact that dentists and doctors enjoy so much control is no
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surprise since the lay public knows little about the technical basis of
medical treatment. Therefore, society places a great deal of trust in
dentists and doctors in not only the provision of medical care, but
also the structure and regulation of the entire healthcare system.
Dentists and doctors have effectively been able to stifle
competition in the healthcare industry, and this lack of competition
has caused segments of the United States population to be
neglected. This neglect is a natural result of the absence of
meaningful competition, for competition would ensure that every
segment of the healthcare market was addressed.
The shockingly poor dental health of Alaska Natives is a
reminder that, although the United States as a whole spends more
1
money per capita on healthcare than any country in the world,
there are still many underserved groups that do not have
fundamental access to care. Alaska Natives are one of these
underserved groups, and despite some efforts to improve their
overall health, their dental health is still the worst of any group in
2
the United States. A limited number of dentists do serve the
Alaska Native population, but the available dentists are not
3
enough to remedy the Alaska Native oral health crisis. The
obvious reasons for this deficiency include the villages’
geographical isolation and the prohibitive costs involved in
4
supplying a sufficient number of dentists to each village.
A recent solution to this crisis has been the introduction of
Dental Therapists into Alaska. Despite their presence in a number
of developed nations, the use of Dental Therapists in Alaska
represents the first use of this form of dental professional in the

1. The United States spends roughly twice as much per capita as the majority
of Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries. Kaiser Family Foundation, Health Care Spending in the United States
and OECD Countries, Jan. 2007, http://www.kff.org/insurance/snapshot/chcm0103
07oth.cfm.
2. See INDIAN HEALTH SERVICE, THE 1999 ORAL HEALTH SURVEY OF
AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE DENTAL PATIENTS: FINDINGS,
REGIONAL DIFFERENCES AND NATIONAL COMPARISONS 9 (1999), available at
http://www.hss.state.ak.us/dph/wcfh/Oralhealth/docs/Oral_Health_1999_IHS_Surv
ey.pdf (“The oral health disparities of [Alaska Native] people are profound when
compared to the general U.S. population.”) [hereinafter IHS REPORT]; Eugene
Sekiguchi, Improving the Oral Health of Alaska Natives, 95 AM. J. PUBLIC
HEALTH 769, 769 (2004) (citing “a great disparity in oral health between the
Alaska Natives and the general population of the United States”).
3. See Sekiguchi, supra note 2, at 769 (“The [Alaska Native] villages are
small and cannot support a full-time dentist or physician, let alone specialists.”).
4. Id. at 769–70.
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United States.5 Their introduction into Alaska relies on a new
professional license given through the Indian Health and Welfare
6
Act’s provision for a Community Health Aide Program.
Candidates for the program are selected from and by the Alaska
Native villages, are trained in New Zealand for eighteen months,
and are subsequently licensed to perform various dental health
7
tasks for the Alaska Native population, including tooth extraction,
8
cavity filling, and pulpotomies.
Although they are not completely opposed to the use of
Dental Therapists for the dental education of Alaska Natives, the
ADA and the Alaska Dental Society are vehemently opposed to
Dental Therapists performing the aforementioned procedures, as
9
they are irreversible. In fact, the ADA and Alaska Dental Society
have recently filed suit against the Alaska Native Tribal Health
Consortium, the State of Alaska, and eight Dental Therapists,
claiming that Dental Therapists are practicing dentistry without a
10
license. This suit is still pending, though the Alaska Attorney
General has written an opinion arguing that the scope of Dental
11
Therapists’ practice is legal due to their unique federal license.
Ultimately, the courts will decide the legality of the use of Dental
Therapists in this case.
Regardless of the legality of Dental Therapists, their mere
introduction has shaken up the structure of dental licensing and has
threatened the exclusive control that dentists previously held over
dental procedures. Competition in the dental field will be good for
consumers because it sends a strong message to healthcare
providers that those who cannot afford high-cost dental care need a
low-cost alternative, which is already becoming available. It
5. See DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN HEALTH SERVICES, ALASKA DENTAL
HEALTH AIDE PROGRAM BRIEF 3 (2005), available at http://www.phsdental.org/depac/chap/Alaska%20Dental%20Health%20Aide%20Program_white
%20paper%20update91405.doc [hereinafter DHA WHITE PAPER].
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Pulpotomies are root canals where only part of the dental pulp is removed.
DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1544 (30th ed. 2003).
9. See Alaska Dental Soc’y v. Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium, No.
3AN-06-04797CI (Alaska Super. Ct. filed Jan. 31, 2006). The jury trial is
scheduled for Oct. 8, 2007.
10. Id.
11. Memorandum from Paul R. Lyle, Sr. Assistant Attorney Gen., State of
Alaska, to Robert E. Warren, DDS, Alaska Bd. of Dental Examiners, File No:
663-05-0152 (Sept. 8, 2005), available at http://notes4.state.ak.us/pn/pubnotic.nsf/
53a2e6f2d0aafc648925672a00602f03/7dd55e5de43af6b58925707e007fceb8/$FILE/6
63-05-0152%20Dental%20Health%20Aides.pdf [hereinafter Lyle Memorandum].
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further emphasizes the importance of solutions that take into
account the unique circumstances of a particular group. By
addressing a part of the market that has been chronically
underserved, Dental Therapists will force the dental establishment
and legislators to more seriously pursue the goal of dental care for
all Alaskans. Furthermore, the introduction of Dental Therapists
is a great triumph for those who disagree with the ADA’s
12
monopolistic attitude regarding the provision of dental services,
and their introduction shows that consumer choice is an
increasingly important concept in the creation of healthcare
options.
This Note will give an overview of the dental licensing process,
explain the dental healthcare crisis suffered by Alaska Natives, and
describe the Dental Therapist program. It will then discuss the
legality of the Dental Therapist program, particularly within the
scope of a recent lawsuit waged by the ADA. Finally, it will
highlight the significance of Dental Therapists as an effective
means for providing cost-effective care to Alaska Natives as part of
a regulatory regime and as a source of much-needed competition in
the national dental industry.
II. DENTAL LICENSING
Dental licensing, as well as licensing for any health
13
professional, is almost always within the purview of the states.
These licensing laws need to pass rational basis review, which is a
fairly easy standard to meet. Some note that the state regulation of
health professionals is a remnant from earlier times and argue that
federal regulation makes more sense now given our efficient
14
communication and national standards of practice. Nonetheless,
there is definite standardization imposed via instruction in dental
school and by the heavy involvement of groups like the ADA, even
15
with state regulation.
Dental licensing is established by state legislation that outlines
the requirements for dental practice in that state and establishes a
16
state dental board. All states require a dental degree from an

12. See Bernard Friedland & Richard W. Valachovic, The Regulation of
Dental Licensing: The Dark Ages?, 17 AM. J. L. & MED. 249, 251 (1991).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 251, 269.
15. Id. at 258–59.
16. AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL BOARD DENTAL
EXAMINATIONS
(NBDE
PART
I
&
II,
DENTAL
HYGIENE),
http://www.ada.org/prof/ed/testing/index.asp (last visited Feb. 4, 2007) [hereinafter
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American or Canadian school, a successful written examination,
and a sufficient clinical examination.17 With regard to the
educational component, all dental schools must meet standards
18
established by the ADA Commission of Dental Accreditation.
The National Board Dental Examination fulfills the written
19
examination requirement in many states to some degree. The
Joint Commission on National Dental Examinations is responsible
20
for administering the National Board Dental Examination. State
dental boards are usually affiliated with the American Association
21
of Dental Examiners. Furthermore, state control of the scope of
practice of both general practitioners and specialists is defined by
22
the ADA Principles of Ethics and Code of Professional Conduct.
In addition, almost all states also require continuing education for
23
relicensure. The ADA also has a large influence on the licensure
of allied dental health professionals, including dental assistants,
AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION]. See also Alaska State Dentistry Act, ALASKA
STAT. § 08.36 (2006).
17. AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 16. Note that medical
doctors, unlike dentists, are not required to pass a clinical examination, but
require additional graduate education before full licensure. AMERICAN DENTAL
ASSOCIATION COUNCIL ON DENTAL EDUCATION AND LICENSURE, DENTAL AND
MEDICAL EDUCATION AND LICENSURE IN THE UNITED STATES: A COMPARISON
(2001), available at http://www.ada.org/prof/prac/licensure/factsheets_compare_
med.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2007). For more information, see ALASKA STAT. §
08.36.110 (2006), outlining the Alaska requirements for licensure, which are
consistent with the requirements of other states.
18. AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION, DENTISTRY – THE MODEL PROFESSION
4, available at http://www.ada.org/prof/resources/positions/statements/statements_
dentistry.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2007 [hereinafter ADA: THE MODEL
PROFESSION]; see also ALASKA STAT. § 08.36.110 (2006) (requiring dentists to be
graduates of an ADA accredited dental school).
19. See AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 16 (“The National
Board Dental Examination is intended to fulfill or partially fulfill the written
examination requirement, but acceptance of National Board scores is completely
at the discretion of the individual state.”); see also ALASKA STAT. § 08.36.110
(2006).
20. AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 16.
21. ADA: THE MODEL PROFESSION, supra note 18, at 3; see also ALASKA
STAT. § 08.36.070 (2006) (describing affiliation with American Association of
Dental Examiners).
22. AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION, ADA PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS AND
CODE
OF
PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT
(2005),
available
at
http://www.ada.org/prof/prac/law/code/index.asp; see also ALASKA STAT. §
08.36.360 (2006) (describing general dentistry practice in Alaska); ALASKA STAT.
§ 08.36.244–.247 (2006) (describing specialist practice in Alaska).
23. ADA: THE MODEL PROFESSION, supra note 18, at 5.
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hygienists, and laboratory technicians, as suggested by the ADA’s
Comprehensive Policy Statement on Dental Auxiliaries.24
III. STRUCTURE OF ALASKA
NATIVE DENTAL CARE AND HEALTHCARE
Due to their tribal membership, many Alaska Natives, like
American Indians, are entitled to unique health services in addition
25
to the health services granted to all American citizens. Indian
Health was first handled by the War Department in 1803, until this
responsibility was transferred to the Bureau of Indian Affairs
26
(BIA) in the Department of the Interior in 1849. By the early
1900s, healthcare became more institutionalized nationwide, and
an organized structure for providing healthcare to Indians was
27
created. Money was given to the BIA to hire physicians, to open
28
The first broad policy
hospitals, and to provide vaccinations.
regarding Indian health occurred with the passage of the Snyder
Act in 1921, which authorized federal money “for relief of distress
and conservation of health . . . of Indians throughout the United
29
States.” In 1955, authority over Indian healthcare was transferred
from BIA to the Indian Health Service (IHS) within the Public
Health Service, which was part of the Department of Health and
30
Human Services (HHS). HHS has recently been reorganized, and
31
now the IHS has its own operating division within HHS.
The Indian Health Care Improvement Act of 1976 and its 1992
amendments acknowledged the continuing federal responsibility of
ensuring the “highest possible health status to Indians and to
provid[ing] existing Indian health services with all resources
32
A Community Health Aide
necessary to effect that policy.”
Program was developed specifically for Alaska by the IHS and

24. Id.; see also ALASKA STAT. § 08.32.010–.190 (2006) (describing licensure of
dental hygienists in Alaska).
25. Rose Pfefferbaum et al., Providing for the Health Care Needs of Native
Americans: Policy, Programs, Procedures, and Practices, 21 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
211, 218 (1997).
26. Id. at 214–15.
27. Id. at 215.
28. Id.
29. Id. (quoting the Snyder Act, 25 U.S.C. § 13 (2006)).
30. Id.
31. Id. That is, it is no longer a subdivision of PHS, although it still works with
PHS.
32. Id. at 216 (citing Indian Health Care Improvement Act, 25 U.S.C. §
1602(a) (1992)).
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approved and funded by Congress in 1968.33 This program was
34
later codified in the Indian Health Care Improvement Act. The
1992 amendment to the Act requires a Community Health Aide
Program that provides for the training of Alaska Natives as health
aides or community health practitioners and the use of these aides
or practitioners in the provision of healthcare and disease
35
prevention to Alaska Natives living in villages in rural Alaska.
Currently there are over 550 Community Health Aides (CHAs)
that perform over 350,000 patient visits a year, and these CHAs are
36
essential to providing healthcare to rural Alaska Natives.
With regard to dental care, Congress set out seven specific
dental objectives to be met by the Community Health Aide
37
Program: (1) reducing dental caries in children, (2) reducing
untreated dental caries in children and adolescents, (3) reducing
the proportion of adults sixty-five and older who have lost all of
their natural teeth, (4) increasing the proportion of adults who
have never lost a permanent tooth due to caries or periodontal
disease, (5) reducing periodontal disease in adults, (6) increasing
the use of protective sealants on permanent teeth in children, and
38
These
(7) reducing the prevalence of gingivitis in adults.
39
objectives are to be met by the Dental Health Aide Program.
Dental care for Alaska Natives is directly funded by the Indian
Health Service. Currently, these services are organized by Alaska
Natives via the Alaska Tribal Health System (IHS directly
provided dental care for Alaska Natives until 1975, when the
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act gave
funding to Alaska Natives and allowed them to coordinate their
40
Under the Alaska Native Claims
own healthcare system).
Settlement Act, tribes are governed “by private, state-chartered,
41
The Act
and state-regulated Native for-profit corporations.”

33. DHA WHITE PAPER, supra note 5, at 4.
34. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1616l (2006)).
35. 25 U.S.C. § 1616l(a) (2006).
36. DHA WHITE PAPER, supra note 5, at 4.
37. Caries are “the molecular decay or death of a bone, in which it becomes
softened, discolored, and porous.”
DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL
DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 298.
38. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1602(20)–(26) (2006).
39. See 25 U.S.C. § 1616l (2006).
40. Sekiguchi, supra note 2, at 770 (citing the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450–58 (2006)).
41. Id.; see also Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–42
(2006). IHS has the responsibility to assume control of the program if tribes forgo
leadership or do not meet certain standards. 25 U.S.C. § 450m (2006).
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further recognizes the ability of tribes to authorize non-profit
organizations to organize healthcare.42 Most tribes have also
entered into an agreement with the IHS called the Alaska Native
Tribe Compact, which outlines healthcare funding and
43
organization.
IHS-funded dental care for Alaska Natives is provided by
dentists who contract with the Alaska Tribal health system or the
IHS, dentists who are United States Public Health Service Corps
44
officers, or dentists who volunteer their work.
IV. THE ALASKA NATIVE DENTAL HEALTH CRISIS
A. The Crisis Explained
The dental health of Alaska Natives is far below that of the
general American public and is the worst of any group in the
45
United States. The Community Health Aide Certification Board
found that “[o]nly 29% of Alaska Native children and even fewer
adults have had access to dental care resulting in epidemic caries
46
among children and loss of teeth among adults and elders.” The
disparity between Native oral health and that of the American
public is especially striking among children and adolescents, who
47
have two-and-a-half times the number of caries of their peers.
Similarly, 68% of Alaska Native children between two and five
years old have untreated tooth decay, compared to only 19% in the
48
general population. Forty-six percent of Alaska Native children
between six and fourteen years old have untreated permanent
49
tooth decay, compared to 11% nationally. Also, approximately
16% of Native adults have periodontal disease compared to

42. Sekiguchi, supra note 2, at 770.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. David A. Nash & Ron J. Nagel, Confronting Oral Health Disparities
Among American Indian/Alaska Native Children: The Pediatric Oral Health
Therapist, 95 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 1325, 1325 (2005). It is important to note
that other American Indians suffer from many of the same oral health problems as
Alaska Natives.
46. COMMUNITY HEALTH AIDE PROGRAM CERTIFICATION BOARD,
STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, § 1.40.010(7) (2005).
47. Sekiguchi, supra note 2, at 769.
48. IHS REPORT, supra note 2, at 18.
http://www.hss.state.ak.us/dph/wcfh/Oralhealth/docs/Oral_Health_1999_IHS_Surv
ey.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2007).
49. Id. at 27.
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roughly 3% in the general population.50 One-third of Alaska
Native children miss school due to dental pain, and one-quarter do
not smile because they are embarrassed about how their teeth
51
look. Of adults over fifty-five, nearly two-thirds of those who still
52
have teeth at a minimum show signs of periodontal disease. In the
same group, about two-thirds had twenty or less teeth, and 21%
53
had no teeth at all. By any metric, the oral health of Alaska
Natives is unacceptably poor.
The oral health of Alaska Natives was significantly worse in
the early 1980s, but the Indian Health Service (IHS), tribes, the
ADA, and the state government worked together to provide access
to dentists, fluorinate water, provide fluoride treatments and
54
sealants, and give overall dental education. Overall dental health
55
Even
was significantly improved as a result of these efforts.
though considerable progress was made, the current data show that
much still needs to be accomplished. Using IHS estimates, the
average Alaska Native patient needs five hours worth of dental
56
work to fully restore his or her teeth. With 85,000 Alaska Natives
57
living in 200 villages, this amounts to 425,000 hours of work
required to fully address every Alaska Native patient’s needs. Put
into perspective, completing this amount of work would take 205
58
full-time dentists a year to complete.
B. Sources of the Alaska Native Dental Care Problem
A central challenge in providing dental care and healthcare to
Alaska Natives is their geographical isolation. Over two-thirds of
59
Alaska Natives live in rural areas with limited access by road.
These rural areas are widespread, and often access is limited to

50. See id. at 46.
51. Nash & Nagel, supra note 45, at 1325.
52. See IHS REPORT, supra note 2, at 52.
53. Id. at 56. The normal adult has thirty-two teeth, four of which are wisdom
teeth. DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 1922
(regarding permanent teeth).
54. Nash & Nagel, supra note 45, at 1325; see also IHS REPORT, supra note 2,
at 1.
55. IHS REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
56. See id. at 61. This figure was acquired by averaging IHS estimates of
minutes required to bring the patient to optimal care. Five different age groups
were averaged together. Id.
57. DHA WHITE PAPER, supra note 5, at 3.
58. This figure was determined by dividing 425,000 hours by 2080 hours per
dentist (a forty-hour work week for fifty-two weeks).
59. See DHA WHITE PAPER, supra note 5, at 3.
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boats, ATVs, airplanes, helicopters, and snowmobiles.60
Additionally, the rural areas of Alaska have a population density of
0.5 persons per square mile, which is 150 times less dense than the
61
United States average. With such sparsely inhabited communities
separated by harsh geographic and weather barriers, it is not
62
possible to support resident physicians or dentists in most villages.
Therefore, dentists must either travel to the villages or residents
63
must be transported to major cities or hub villages for treatment.
Travel must be done by bush plane or boat and the closest clinic is
64
often hundreds of miles away. Visits by dentists to the villages are
65
For
limited by their availability and are fairly infrequent.
example, contract dentists typically spend between two to six
weeks per village and must work ten- to fourteen-hour days due to
66
the large number of patients needing care. Anecdotal evidence
from volunteer dentists indicates that even when dentists visit a
village, not everyone is seen, despite the dentists working
67
practically all of their waking hours.
Beyond geographical isolation, there are several behavioral
and general health issues that contribute to poor dental health.
Alaska Natives consume large amounts of soda and sugary foods,
which can lead to tooth decay and are major factors in the
disproportionately high development of diabetes in the Native
68
Many Alaska Natives smoke and chew tobacco,
population.
starting as early as thirteen years old, which increases the risk of
69
developing oral cancer and periodontal disease. Finally, many

60. Id.; see also Sekiguchi, supra note 2, at 769.
61. Sekiguchi, supra note 2, at 769.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Nash & Nagel, supra note 45, at 1325.
65. DHA WHITE PAPER, supra note 5, at 3–4.
66. Jennifer Garvin, Controversy in Alaska, 33 AGD IMPACT 4 (April 2005),
available at http://www.agd.org/library/2005/april/garvin.asp.
67. Robert Raiber, Inside Alaska: The Long and Difficult Journey to Oral
Health, 17 NYSDA NEWS 1, 1–2, 4 (2004).
68. 1 DIV. OF PUB. HEALTH, ALASKA DEP’T OF HEALTH AND SOC. SERVICES,
HEALTHY ALASKANS 2010, ch. 13, at 3–4 (2001), available at
http://www.hss.state.ak.us/dph/targets/ha2010/PDFs/13_Oral_Health.pdf.
69. See IHS REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. Two percent of thirteen-year-olds,
thirty-four percent of nineteen-year-olds, and thirty-eight percent of adults are
habitual users of tobacco. Thirty-one percent of fifteen- to nineteen-year-olds,
fifty-one percent of adults thirty-three to thirty-five, and twenty-eight percent of
adults over fifty-five use tobacco. Id. at 2–3.
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Alaska Natives simply do not brush their teeth, despite distribution
of and education regarding toothbrushes and toothpaste.70
Another large part of the problem is structural. In 2002, there
were 463 dentists in the state of Alaska serving 642,000 people—
71
the ratio was 1:1386 compared to the national average of 1:1695.
Thus, despite a shortage of dentists serving the Native population,
Alaska as a state has more dentists per capita than average.
Although there were seventy-two dentists serving the Alaska
Native community, there are ninety total IHS dental positions,
72
leaving eighteen unfilled. Compounding this 20% vacancy, the
turnover rate for dentists serving the Alaska Native community is
73
30%. Because of this shortage, dentists are mainly available only
74
for emergency services. This lack of dentists and high degree of
turnover is not surprising since geographically isolated
communities may not be appealing to dentists, especially because,
for the most part, the dentists who are serving the Alaska Native
75
Without these
community are outsiders with no cultural ties.
important cultural roots, it is difficult for foreign dentists to fully
convince Alaska Natives, especially children, that changing their
76
As previously
poor dental behavioral habits is a good thing.
noted, it is impossible for IHS to put a dentist or a physician in
every village. It would seem that the answer to the Alaska Native
oral health problem is a culturally sensitive dental care provider

70.
71.
72.
73.

See Raiber, supra note 67, at 2.
See Sekiguchi, supra note 2, at 770.
Id.
COMMUNITY HEALTH AIDE PROGRAM CERTIFICATION BOARD,
STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES § 1.40.010(9) (2005).
74. Id.
75. See Nash & Nagel, supra note 45, at 1325.
76. For an example of this phenomenon, consider this story told by Dr. Carl
Jenkins: “Let me relate the story of the middle-school girl who came to me at
lunch with a can of pop she had just bought from the school’s soda machine. . . .
Knowing I was the dentist, she looked right at me and proudly exclaimed, ‘I’m
drinking pop,’ as if to say, ‘What are you going to do about it?’ Did she need
education? No! She knew the pop was bad for her but in her new culture
enjoying that can of pop is a status symbol. What she needs is motivation by
someone of her own culture. No white dentist from the mountains of
Pennsylvania was going to change her mind of that. What is needed is an
educated professional that can help treat but also live among the people.” Garvin,
supra note 66.
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that can live in the community to be a continual influence of good
dental habits and earn the respect of the community.77
Because this problem is persistent and needs urgent attention,
immediate and long-term solutions must be implemented. In
theory, more Alaska Natives could be trained as full-fledged
dentists, but this would take at least four years of dental school on
top of their undergraduate educations. Consider also that only 9%
of Native Americans aged twenty-five or older are college
78
graduates, compared to the rate of 20% in the general population.
Therefore, it is unrealistic to suggest that many Alaska Native
dentists could be trained to address the Native dental health crisis
in a time-sensitive manner.
In sum, the dental problem is marked by limited access to
dentists, geographical barriers, and behavioral problems. The
problem is urgent and requires an immediate solution to reverse
the dental health crisis that plagues Alaska Natives. Compounding
the shortage of dentists in general is a shortage of dentists from the
same culture as their clients and who have ties to the community.
The turnover rate among dentists is quite significant and the
number of Native dentists is strikingly low. A solution to the
problem is a low-cost, culturally sensitive, relatively quickly-trained
dental health professional.
V. DENTAL HEALTH AIDES: A SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS
A. Overview of Dental Health Aides and Dental Therapists
The Dental Health Aide Program started in 2001 as part of the
79
The CHAP
Community Health Aide Program (CHAP).
generally trains Alaska Natives to become Community Health
Aides, who provide overall healthcare and healthcare education to
80
Community Health Aides are
the Alaska Native villages.

77. Id. (quoting Dr. Kelso: “No team of dentists, volunteers or public health
dentists, will be able to do that because at one time or another, they will have to
leave.”).
78. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NCES 98-291,
AMERICAN INDIANS AND ALASKA NATIVES IN POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION, ch. 1,
at 14 (1998). This statistic is used to demonstrate that the process of training new
dentists would take at least four, but more realistically eight or more years, for the
majority of the Native population. This timeframe makes this solution an unlikely
one in fixing the immediate Alaska Native dental health problem.
79. DHA WHITE PAPER, supra note 5, at 3–4.
80. Id. at 4, 5.
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supervised by physicians located in hub communities, and these
physicians advise the Aides via phone.81
The Dental Health Aide Program operates in a similar
82
manner, with aides remotely supervised and advised by a dentist.
It was developed by the Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium
in conjunction with the IHS and is funded by federal funds for the
CHAP and by foundations, non-profit organizations, and the tribal
83
health system. There are four categories of Dental Health Aides:
(1) Primary Dental Health Aides, who “provide dental education,
dental assisting [and] preventative dentistry services,” (2)
Expanded Function Dental Health Aides, who “serve as expanded
duty dental assistants in regional clinics,” (3) Dental Health Aide
Hygienists, who “provide dental hygiene services in regional clinics
and villages,” and (4) Dental Health Aide Therapists (Dental
Therapists), who provide “oral exams, preventative dental services,
simple restorations, stainless steel crowns, extractions and take x84
Dental Therapists are the most controversial form of
rays.”
Dental Health Aide, since they perform some of the same
procedures that had previously been limited to licensed dentists.
However, while Dental Therapists can perform these procedures
without direct dentist supervision, their performance is continually
85
assessed to ensure that their work meets certain set standards.
Dental Therapists are trained at the University of Otago in
New Zealand through a clinically-intensive two-year program
based on New Zealand’s own very successful Dental Therapist
86
Candidates for the program are recruited by the
program.
87
individual Alaskan tribes. As of September 2005, eight Alaska
88
Native students were enrolled in the program.
To practice, Dental Therapists must meet the technical
requirements outlined in the Standards and Procedures of the
Federal Community Health Aide Program, administered by a
twelve-member Certification Board, which is established by 25
89
U.S.C. § 1616l. Before being allowed to practice without direct
supervision, Dental Therapists must undergo a preceptorship,

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 5.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 4–5.
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under which their skills are assessed by a dentist.90 This skills
91
assessment is repeated every two years. Dental Therapists must
92
also participate in continuing education in order to be recertified.
The initial preceptorship lasts four hundred clinical hours under
93
the direct supervision of a dentist. When practicing in villages, the
Dental Therapists are in regular phone contact with their
supervising dentists, and they regularly send x-rays and
photographs by email for evaluation and assessment on whether
94
referral to a hub clinic is necessary. Dental Therapists in the
United States are licensed only through the Community Health
Aide Program and may only service Alaska Natives in Native
95
health clinics.
The World Health Organization (WHO) also reports that
forty-two total countries have some form of Dental Therapist
96
position. In New Zealand, for instance, Dental Health Aides are
nothing new. Since 1921, they have been providing dental care to
97
New Zealand primary schools. In New Zealand, children between
six months to thirteen years old may participate in the School
Dental Service program, where Dental Therapists provide free
98
Ninety-seven percent of
preventative and restorative care.
99
children are enrolled in this service. Notably, virtually 100% of
dental caries in New Zealand children were treated, compared to
between 63% and 74% of child caries in the general United States
100
population. In further illustration, only 35% of caries in Alaska
101
With the
Native children aged two to five were treated.
introduction of Dental Therapists in New Zealand, the ratio of
90. Id. at 5.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Ron Nagel, Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium, Presentation at the
2006 American Association for Community Dental Programs’ Annual Meeting
and Symposium (Apr. 30, 2006), http://www.aacdp.com/docs/2006Nagel.ppt
(PowerPoint presentation).
94. DHA WHITE PAPER, supra note 5, at 6.
95. See Lyle Memorandum, supra note 11.
96. Alaska Primary Care Association, Board of Directors, Support of Dental
Therapist/Dental Health Aide Program, Res. 2006-05 (2006), available at
http://www.alaskapca.org/Programs/ALA/Resolutions/Res%20200605%20Dental%20Therapists.doc.
97. Nash & Nagel, supra note 45, at 1326.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. The data for the United States are for primary and permanent teeth
through the age of fourteen.
101. Id.
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extractions to restorations went from seventy-five extractions per
one hundred restorations in the 1920s to 3.6 extractions per one
102
hundred restorations in 1964.
Canada also trains Dental Therapists according to the New
Zealand model, and these therapists work on First Nations
103
When Dental Therapists were introduced in Canada,
reserves.
the ratio of extractions per restorations went from fifty extractions
per hundred restorations in 1974 to fewer than ten extractions per
104
Furthermore, the work of
hundred restorations in 1986.
restorations done by Dental Therapists in Canada was compared to
those done by dentists in a double-blind study, and the quality of
105
restorations between both groups was equal.
B. Opposition to Dental Health Aides and Alternative Solutions
Although the ADA supports the Dental Health Aide
Program, the ADA is opposed to Dental Therapists to the extent
that they perform irreversible procedures, and the organization
contends that only licensed dentists are technically qualified to
106
As a
extract teeth, drill cavities, or perform pulpotomies.
foundation for its argument, the ADA cites the fact that many
adults have medical conditions that add to the complexity of dental
treatment, such that simple procedures can quickly become more
107
complicated ones.
The ADA claims that the choice is not between no care and
care provided by Dental Therapists; instead, it wants to bring more
108
In conjunction with more
actual dentists to Native villages.
dentists, the ADA wants a Dental Health Aide in every village to
109
Furthermore, it
provide preventative and educational services.
wants to make dentists more efficient by increasing the number of
110
available dental aides and dental chairs. To help encourage more

102. Id. at 1327. Fluorination of water, among other things, could also partially
account for some of this marked improvement.
103. Id. at 1326. First Nations people are the native inhabitants of Canada.
104. Id. at 1327.
105. Id.
106. ADA POSITION ON THE DENTAL HEALTH AIDE PROGRAM IN ALASKA,
http://www.ada.org/prof/resources/positions/statements/position_dentalaide_alask
a.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2007) [hereinafter ADA POSITION].
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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dentists to serve Alaska Natives, the ADA created “Operation
Backlog,” though this effort was met with limited success.111
Since the ADA recommends that Congress not permit Dental
Therapists to practice dentistry in Alaska, some dentists have
called for more Alaska Natives to attend dental school and return
112
to serve their communities. The ADA has suggested that dental
clinics be set up in geographically appropriate villages, so that
access by neighboring villages can be easier. Dentists have also
called for the availability of potable fluorinated water, in order to
113
reduce the consumption of soda. The ADA attempted to reduce
the credentialing paperwork bureaucracy involved with allowing
114
out-of-state volunteer dentists to practice on a temporary basis.
Finally, the ADA and others have lobbied Congress to increase
115
dental health funding to IHS.
There are many problems with the ADA’s suggestions. The
ADA position does not address the need for a local practitioner
who can deal with local emergencies. Furthermore, the ADA
ignores the tremendous amount of work that must be done in a
short amount of time, which would truly require an army of
dentists. It also does not fully address the vacancy problem or
reluctance that many dentists would have in serving in rural
116
Alaska. The ADA’s primary opposition rests on their assertion
that Dental Therapists are not technically qualified to perform
certain procedures, but they ignore the fact that Dental Therapists
have been hugely successful worldwide. Most notably, the oral
health crisis that had plagued the First Nations population in
Canada, a very similar crisis to the one currently affecting Alaska
Natives, was rectified in large part by the utilization of Dental
Therapists.

111. Id.; see also American Dental Association, Alaska Q & A: What Is the
ADA’s Role?, ADANEWS, Aug. 5, 2005, http://www.ada.org/prof/advocacy/legal/
alaska/adanews.asp?articleid=1502.
112. Garvin, supra note 66.
113. Sekiguchi, supra note 2, at 772.
114. ADA POSITION, supra note 106.
115. ADA TESTIMONY ON THE FISCAL YEAR 2002 APPROPRIATION FOR THE
INDIAN HEALTH SERVICE, http://www.ada.org/public/manage/you/working_
access_testimony.pdf (Apr. 16, 2001).
116. For example, University of Washington Professor of Dentistry Louis Fiset
notes that five full-time paid dentist positions in the Yukon-Kushkokwim Delta
have been vacant for six years despite a salary/benefits package starting at
$177,000. Louis Fiset, A Report on Quality Assessment of Primary Care Provided
by Dental Therapists to Alaska Natives, ANTHC.ORG, Sept. 30, 2005, at 2,
http://www.anthc.org/cs/chs/chap/upload/Fiset%20evaluation.pdf.
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It is also important to note that an independent evaluation of
Dental Therapists’ technical work in September 2005 was very
117
Dentists who worked directly with the Dental
positive.
Therapists were enthusiastic about the quality of their work, and
agreed that their work and their skills in dealing with children were
118
None of the dentists who worked with and
especially good.
directly observed the Dental Therapists had any trepidation about
119
The
the Therapists practicing in villages without supervision.
independent evaluator’s assessment of Alaska Native Dental
Therapists focused on record review, cavity preparation and
120
The
restoration, patient management, and patient safety.
evaluator found that the Dental Therapists met the established
121
standard of care in every metric.
Most importantly, the Dental Therapists were aware of the
limits of their abilities and erred on the side of caution with regard
122
The
to referring complicated problems to a licensed dentist.
evaluator concluded his assessment of the program by stating that
he believed that Dental Therapists “have demonstrated their
proficiency in providing competent and safe dental care to Alaska
Natives,” and that “the program deserves not only to continue but
123
He further stated that the Dental Therapist
to expand.”
approach was successful in providing care “that gives priority to
124
education, prevention, early intervention, and access.”
VI. DENTAL THERAPISTS AND LEGAL ISSUES
A. Legal Overview
The legality of the Dental Therapist program is a complex
issue that will ultimately have to be argued within and debated by
the courts for a definitive answer. Again, state governments (in
conjunction with professional organizations) are typically
responsible for the licensing of dental professionals and other

117. Id.
118. Id. at 3. This report also notes that some dentists were originally skeptical
about Dental Therapists, but upon observing the Therapists in action, they found
that Therapist interaction with children was even better than the interaction of
dentists.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 2–3.
121. Id. at 8.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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healthcare professionals. What makes the Dental Therapist
program so unique, legally speaking, are the novel federal licensing
scheme and the foundations in American Indian law upon which
the program is based.
The Alaska Board of Dental Examiners, unsure of the legality
of the Dental Therapist program, sought an opinion from the
125
The Alaska Attorney General
Alaska Attorney General.
concluded that the Dental Therapist program was legal based on
federal preemption theories and in doing so stated:
The state dental licensure laws stand as an obstacle to Congress’
objective to provide dental treatment to Alaska Natives by using
non-dentist, non-hygienist paraprofessionals. Therefore, the
federal statute that mandates the development of the dental
health aide standards and the certification of dental health aides
displaces (or preempts) the state’s dental licensure law and
renders it unenforceable against federally-certified dental health
126
aides.

The basis for federal supremacy is the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution, which states that federal law preempts
state law whenever that state’s law contradicts or interferes with an
127
Preemption can occur where “Congress has
act of Congress.
expressly preempted state law,” where “Congress has legislated so
comprehensively that federal law occupies an entire field of
regulation and leaves no room for state law,” or “where federal law
128
conflicts with state law.”
There is a presumption that state law applies over federal law
in areas where the state is traditionally responsible, such as
129
healthcare regulation, which is part of a state’s police power.
Despite this presumption, state law is preempted when “state law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
130
full purposes and objectives of Congress.”
In its analysis, the Alaska Attorney General concluded that
Alaska Statute chapter 08.32 and Alaska Statute chapter 08.36,
which govern dentist and hygienist licensing, conflict with 25 U.S.C.
§ 1616l. Section 1616l allows for the creation of a Community
Health Aide, in this case a Dental Therapist, to address the dental
125. See Lyle Memorandum, supra note 11.
126. Id. at 2.
127. Id. at 3 (citing Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S.
141, 152 (1982); Hayfield N. R.R. Co. v. Chicago & Nw. Transp. Co., 467 U.S. 622,
627 (1984)). See also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
128. Lyle Memorandum, supra note 11, at 3 (quoting Wachovia Bank v. Burke,
414 F.3d 305, 313 (2d. Cir. 2005)).
129. Id. at 4–5.
130. Id. at 6 (quoting Hankins v. Finnel, 964 F.2d 853, 861 (8th Cir. 1992)).
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health objectives set forth in 25 U.S.C. §§ 1602(20)–(26).131
Congress’ power to legislate in this area is further bolstered by the
fact that the United States has had a legal and moral obligation to
“‘provide adequate healthcare and services to Indian tribes and
th
132
Thus, the Attorney
their members’ since the 19 century.”
General concluded that:
Congress intended to provide dental care to Alaska Natives
through a comprehensive federal system of paraprofessional
aides, trained by program-accredited teachers using a federallydeveloped curriculum and licensed by a federal board under
federal standards, whose performance following certification
would be closely supervised, reviewed and evaluated by the
Secretary [of Health and Human Services] and updated through
133
federally-mandated continuing education requirements.

As a result of this legislation and Congress’ intent conflicting with
state dental professional licensing laws, the Alaska Attorney
General concluded that state laws are preempted by the federal
law and the federal licensing of Dental Health Aides and Dental
134
Therapists is legal.
Although the Alaska Attorney General is certainly an expert
source of analysis on Alaska law, the office’s memorandum
135
However, the
opinions are not per se binding on any entity.
Alaska State Dental Board has still not attempted to prosecute any
136
Dental Therapists for violating the Alaska Dental Practice Act.
The ADA and the Alaska Dental Society were dissatisfied with the
opinion regarding the legality of the Dental Therapist program and
consequently initiated a lawsuit in an effort to end the program.
B. The American Dental Association Lawsuit
In conjunction with a public relations campaign against the use
of Dental Therapists in Alaska, the ADA and the Alaska Dental
Society filed suit against the Alaska Native Tribal Health

131. Id. at 8–9.
132. Id. at 4 n.8 (quoting S. REP. NO. 102-392, at 2 (1992)).
133. Id. at 10.
134. Id. at 15–16.
135. Diaz v. Silver Bay Logging, Inc., 55 P.3d 732, 743 (Alaska 2002) (Fabe,
C.J., dissenting).
136. By not further pursuing any state regulation or enforcement of existing
laws on the Dental Therapist program, the State has effectively chosen to regulate
by inaction. However, this is not a pure case of regulation by inaction because the
federal government and IHS are responsible for the regulatory creation of the
Dental Therapist program.
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Consortium (ANTHC), the State of Alaska, and eight John Does.137
The ADA alleged that the Dental Therapists controlled by the
ANTHC were practicing dentistry without a license as they claim is
138
required under the Alaska Dental Practice Act (“the Act”). The
ADA noted that, as of August 31, 2005, four Dental Therapists
performed 765 patient exams, and in doing so they provided
numerous services including preventative treatments, restorations,
139
The ADA
stainless steel crowns, pulpotomies, and extractions.
further alleged that the State of Alaska failed to enforce the State
Dentistry Act, and that the Alaska State Dental Examiners Board,
which the ADA claims has sole jurisdiction over licensing of any
140
dental professional, has the obligation to enforce the Act.
The ADA initially asked for declaratory relief in the form of a
holding that Dental Therapists’ practice fell within the scope of the
Alaska Dental Practice Act and that the Act is enforceable against
141
Dental Therapists. It also alleged an equal protection violation
under the Alaska Constitution, claiming that the State has granted
an exception to the Dental Therapist program from the Act and
142
that no such exception has been granted to dentists. Accordingly,
the ADA requested an injunction against the State, instructing it to
enforce the Alaska Dental Practice Act against the Dental
143
Under the Act, the ADA requested a
Therapist program.
declaration that, to practice dentistry, a person must hold a
certificate of successful examination granted by the ADA Joint
Commission on National Dental Examinations, and that any
person performing dental services without such a certificate is
144
Furthermore, the ADA sought
illegally practicing dentistry.
declarations that Dental Therapists do not hold this certification,
137. Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
at 1–3, Alaska Dental Soc’y v. State, 3AN-06-04797 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. Jan. 31,
2006). The John Does sued are several unnamed practicing Dental Therapists.
138. Id. at 4–6.
139. Id. at 6. Note that this number only incorporates figures from four Dental
Therapists over a period lasting slightly over a year. Since there are eight Dental
Therapists currently practicing, with more on the way, the number of patients
treated over the length of the program is likely to be a few times higher by the
time of publication.
140. Id. at 7–9. Recall that the Alaska State Dental Examiners Board was the
party that solicited the Alaska Attorney General opinion on the legality of the
Dental Therapist program.
141. Id. at 10–13.
142. Id. at 13–14.
143. Id. at 14–15.
144. Id. at 15–16. The ADA’s injunctive and declaratory requests essentially
amount to compelling the State Dental Board to regulate by litigation.
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do not pay licensing fees to the Board of Dental Examiners, and
are therefore violating the Act.145 Finally, the ADA sought an
injunction prohibiting Dental Therapists from practicing their
146
current form of dentistry.
The ANTHC, in a motion for summary judgment, stated that
the ADA is opposed to Dental Therapists providing care
anywhere, and that state laws “give[] dentists a near-monopoly on
147
The ANTHC cited the Alaska Attorney
dental health care.”
General’s opinion to the Alaska State Dental Examiners Board,
148
which highlighted federal conflict preemption. More specifically,
they argued, as the Alaska Attorney General did, that the Indian
Self-Determination Act and Indian Health Care Improvement Act
preempt the licensing requirements set forth in the Alaska Dental
149
The ANTHC also argued that the ADA has no
Practice Act.
statutory or implied private cause of action under the Alaska
Dental Practice Act, and therefore has no cause of action upon
150
Additionally, the ANTHC argued that the
which it can sue.
151
ADA failed to join the United States as an indispensable party.
The ANTHC disputed the ADA’s equal protection claim, noting
that federal preemption excludes Dental Therapists from the
Alaska Dental Practice Act, and it also argued that dentists and
Dental Therapists are not “similarly situated groups,” and thus do
not raise the question of whether similarly situated groups are
152
The State of Alaska also filed a motion for
treated differently.
153
summary judgment on nearly the same grounds.
It is difficult to predict the outcome of this case, but the
ANTHC has a very strong federal preemption claim that is
bolstered by the previously discussed Alaska Attorney General’s
memorandum opinion. As this Note goes to press, the case is still
pending. In the meantime, Dental Therapists are still practicing in
Alaska Native villages and new ones are being trained in New
Zealand.

145. Id. at 16–18.
146. Id. at 19.
147. ANTHC Motion for Summary Judgment at 14, Alaska Dental Soc’y v.
State, 3AN-06-04797 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. Dec. 1, 2006).
148. Id. at 15.
149. Id. at 16–17.
150. Id. at 21–27.
151. Id. at 28–38.
152. Id. at 38–45.
153. See State Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Alaska Dental
Soc’y v. State, 3AN-06-04797 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. Dec. 1, 2006).
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VII. REGULATION AND DENTAL THERAPISTS
A. Regulatory Foundations
In order to fully understand the policy implications and
political motivation underlying the debate over Dental Therapists,
it is important to first understand the nature of regulatory schemes,
specifically healthcare regulation.
When coupled with an
examination of the unmet dental needs of Alaska Natives, such an
understanding helps to answer the question of whom Alaskans can
trust to bring the regulatory scheme into accord with the needs of
the public.
1. Theories of Regulation. At the most basic level, there are
two fundamental theories on regulation that illustrate whom
regulation serves. The major theories are the Public Interest
Theory and the Economic Theory of Regulation (also called
154
In addition, there are some variants and
Capture Theory).
synergisms of these two theories that merit discussion.
a. Public Interest Theory.
The Public Interest Theory
assumes that regulators act to improve national well-being via
market regulation, and consequently special interests are not the
155
intended beneficiaries of regulation. The Public Interest Theory
starts from the premise that markets are fragile and will operate
156
inefficiently or inequitably without some degree of regulation.
Furthermore, the Public Interest Theory assumes that such
157
regulation is effectively costless to the public. Market fragility is
especially problematic in industries that are prone to
monopolization or where significant externalities negatively affect
158
Regulations can therefore either prevent
the market.
monopolization or control it, and externalities can be appropriately
accounted for. The logic behind public interest regulation is
especially compelling in dental and healthcare markets, since the

154. George Stigler originally named his theory “the Economic Theory of
Regulation,” but it is also commonly referred to as “Capture Theory.”
155. Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle & Andrew Dorchak, Choosing How to
Regulate, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 214 (2005).
156. Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SCI. 335, 336 (1974).
157. Id.
158. Id.
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licensing of healthcare professionals prevents unqualified people
from providing medical services to the general public.159
Under this theory, the fact that regulation sometimes harms
the public can be attributed either to immaturity of new regulations
that are destined to evolve once experience is gained with the
160
Furthermore, the
market dynamic, or to regulator ineptitude.
Public Interest Theory acknowledges that corruption of selfinterested regulators does exist, but that such corruption is an
161
It also acknowledges that
exception rather than the rule.
regulatory agencies may overly focus on their own jurisdiction to
the detriment of other jurisdictions, and therefore limitations to the
162
scope of a regulatory agency’s operation are often necessary.
If the public interest were the sole impetus for regulation, we
would expect to see regulation primarily in industries particularly
susceptible to monopolization or high externalities, but empirical
163
Furthermore, the reality is that
research has proven otherwise.
the actual process of regulation is highly costly, and regulation
frequently has high social costs because of inefficiencies in the
process and because regulations are often squarely against
164
promoting public interests.
b. Economic Theory of Regulation / Capture Theory.
Inherent flaws in the Public Interest Theory spawned the
165
This theory
development of the Capture Theory of regulation.
argues that, in reality, industries welcome regulation since industry
players can use political power to craft regulations that favor
166
Indeed, the government can exercise control over
themselves.
markets that market players could never create themselves,
including subsidies, barriers to entry, control of substitutes to a
167
Capture Theory also argues that the
product, and price fixing.
benefits of such self-interested regulations to a particular group are

159. Externalities would be huge in a world without healthcare professional
licensing, since many people would be injured by harmful care. Furthermore, it
would be difficult for people to find qualified professionals without an adequate
licensing regime.
160. Posner, supra note 156, at 337–39.
161. Morriss, supra note 155, at 214–16.
162. Id. at 215–16.
163. Posner, supra note 156, at 336.
164. Id. at 339–40.
165. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SCI. 2, 3 (1971).
166. Id. at 3.
167. Id. at 3–6.
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always outweighed by the cost to the public—that is, such
regulation actually causes a net economic loss to society.168 In
creating regulations that benefit a certain group, that group is said
to have captured that market.
George Stigler, who first developed the Capture Theory, cited
169
occupational licensing as a prime example of market capture.
Occupational licensing is subject to the political power of interest
groups both because it is normally under the purview of the state
police power and because professional licensing is a highly effective
barrier to entry (practicing without a license in a profession is
170
punishable by criminal sanctions). Stigler noted that the level of
political power of an occupation depends on the size of the
occupation, the per capita income of its members, and the
171
concentration of its members in large cities. This political power
can potentially be countered by a strong opposition to licensing
172
Dentists and physicians are prime
that particular group.
examples of occupations with large amounts of political power,
because there are many of them in practice, they are among the
highest-paid professionals in the nation, and they tend to
173
Furthermore, there is virtually no
concentrate in big cities.
opposition to the licensing of either group.
In many cases, a variety of special interest groups propose
solutions that can arguably be of some public interest, but it is
impossible for a politician to objectively determine the best
174
regulatory solution. In convincing a politician to regulate in the
interest group’s preferred manner, the group is said to have
175
“captured” the politician. The interest group must then maintain
its influence over the politician in order to be able to maintain its
176
preferred form of regulation. The core conclusion from Capture
Theory is that private organizations use legislators and agencies to
create industry regulations that benefit a particular group’s

168. Id. at 10–12 (“When an industry receives a grant of power from the state,
the benefit to the industry will fall short of the damages to the rest of the
community.”).
169. Id. at 13.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 13–14.
172. Id. at 14.
173. See id. at 15–17.
174. Morriss, supra note 155, at 218–19.
175. Id. at 219.
176. Id.

05__SMITH.DOC

2007]

6/7/2007 3:21 PM

DENTAL THERAPISTS IN ALASKA

129

interest.177 In other words, there is always significant self-interest in
178
the regulatory process that the Public Interest Theory neglects.
c. Other Theories of Regulation. Although some industries
may arguably be captured by one single interest group, many
industries are in reality controlled by a few powerful groups,
sometimes with diverging interests. One variation to the Economic
Theory of Regulation addresses the power of ideology in
regulation. This theory, entitled the “bootleggers and Baptists”
theory, explains that lobbying efforts by one group with an
arguably moral high-ground, the Baptists, can be combined with
the lobbying efforts of another group, the bootleggers, to influence
179
a particular form of regulation. In providing an example of this
theory, Bruce Yandle explained that Baptists wanted liquor sales
prohibited on Sundays for moral reasons and bootleggers wanted
180
the same thing because it would reduce their competition.
Legislators succumbed to these influences and prohibited Sunday
sales of liquor, a result that neither group could have achieved by
181
itself.
While this model is effective in highlighting the dangers of
affording too much regulatory control to private actors, it is
important to note that regulation is still useful for promoting the
general welfare of the public. Regulation can maintain markets

177. Id. at 220–21.
178. Id. at 220. In explaining his theory, Stigler argued that regulation can
actually be thought of as a market good that certain industries seek, rather than
one imposed upon them. Id. at 221. He illustrated, in economic terms, the
benefits that regulation can give to an industry and the corresponding possible
detriments to society. See generally Stigler, supra note 165. The desire of an
industry to achieve these benefits via regulation represents a neoclassical
economic demand for the regulation. Id. at 3. The nature of the political process
represents a corresponding supply of regulation. Id. This supply and demand
analysis explains why some groups vigorously solicit and achieve a particular form
of regulation while others do not.
179. Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers, Baptists, and the Global Warming Battle, 26
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 177, 188 (2002).
180. Id.
181. See id. Yandle also analogized this situation to international negotiation
on global warming. Id. at 189–90. In his observation, environmental groups and
industry special interest groups standing to benefit from environmental regulation
have together successfully lobbied for regulatory standards. Id. at 189–95. He
argues that these standards are an inefficient means for environmental regulation
and that penalty taxes would have been a more effective solution; however, these
groups with divergent interests successfully lobbied for a socially undesirable
result that served their respective interests. Id. at 194–95.
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that are likely to operate inefficiently or inequitably without it.
Dental professionals, like other professionals, must be licensed and
regulated by the government to ensure reliability and consistency.
However, the bootleggers and Baptists variation on Capture
Theory is a reminder that socially undesirable results can emanate
from unlikely collaborations between different, and sometimes
very diverse, interest groups.
2. Shifts in Regulation. The paradigm of regulation has
changed over the past thirty years from advancing “accepted goals
of reliability” to one where competition is promoted and consumer
182
This change is seen in the shifts made in
choice is maximized.
183
regulating the common carrier and public utilities industries. The
shift is marked by the lowering of entry barriers, the unbundling of
previously packaged services, and by giving consumers tangible
184
The focus has moved from standardizing and
service choices.
controlling industries, to ensuring that bottlenecks are eliminated
and that a tendency for natural monopolies does not stifle
185
competition. The impetus for all of these changes is difficult to
pinpoint and is most likely a combination of new technologies,
lobbying by interest groups, and most importantly an invigorated
186
attitude toward the benefits of capitalistic competition.
Regulation in “deregulated” industries still exists, but it takes a less
invasive role by allowing competition to be a more prominent
187
normalizing force.
An example of this regulatory shift was evident in the airline
industry, which deregulated pursuant to the Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978. Prior to this Act, airlines were required to present
proposed routes to the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), which
would then decide whether the airline’s rates were for the “public
188
Essentially, the CAB controlled
convenience and necessity.”
entry, and the result was that in many occasions only one airline
189
was afforded the opportunity to fly certain routes. Now, airlines
are able to fly whatever route at whatever rate desired, without

182. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of
Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1323 (1998).
183. Id. at 1323–24.
184. Id. at 1325–26.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1384–1403.
187. Id. at 1324–26.
188. Id. at 1335.
189. Id.
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prior approval.190 This deregulation caused an explosion in
consumer choice, and the corresponding competition caused prices
to drop and a great increase in the availability of flight access to
many cities.
Another example is found by analyzing the FCC’s policy of
gradually unbundling telecommunication services, particularly
191
local phone services from long distance services. Previously, the
major phone companies had a monopoly over both local and long
distance services, but the FCC eventually forced local carriers to
afford customers the ability to purchase long distance services from
192
Although this deregulation was not
a variety of carriers.
problem-free, phone service technology has been greatly enhanced
and customers have far more options regarding what types of
services they can buy.
Also, cross subsidies were ended in certain industries where
universal access is required, such as in the case of the provision of
193
These subsidies were not
rural telephone or electrical services.
necessarily directly eliminated, but their form has changed. That is,
since competition entered the market, industries could no longer
charge above market rates to certain customers in order to
subsidize higher cost customers; instead, these subsidies were
either eliminated and paid for by the high cost customer, or more
transparent fees were charged to maintain the subsidies more
194
openly.
In the previously mentioned regulatory regime shifts, the old
regimes all focused on the needs of monopolistic service providers
and ignored competition to such an extent that competition was
195
The new goal is to promote
often completely eliminated.
competition in as many industries as possible with regulators
196
Before, agencies determined entry,
playing less intrusive roles.
types of service, rates, profits, and the acceptability of various types
of transactions; now, the regulators permit the end user and the
197
market to make these choices. Regulators only intervene when it
is unlikely that the market will function properly without a low
198
degree of control.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id.
Id. at 1340–43.
Id. at 1342–43.
Id. at 1346–49.
Id.
Id. at 1349–51.
Id. at 1350.
Id. at 1349–51.
Id. at 1361.
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B. Regulation of Healthcare Professionals
1. Anticompetitive Tendencies Among Healthcare Providers.
A similar shift can be seen in healthcare markets due to more
aggressive antitrust law enforcement. Though not industry specific
regulation, antitrust laws enable the government to more generally
protect competition in a variety of markets. In the healthcare
context, antitrust laws exposed economically self-interested
behavior veiled in the name of consumer protection and exposed
claims that the most educated or traditional healthcare
professionals were the only group qualified to make decisions
199
Illustrative cases include FTC v. Indiana
about medical care.
200
Federation of Dentists, in which the Federal Trade Commission
filed a complaint alleging restraint of trade against the Indiana
Federation of Dentists, which had agreed among its members that
it would not submit x-rays to dental insurers in order to control
201
decisions about care. The Supreme Court refused to allow this
activity, reasoning that consumers should be allowed to contract
with insurers for particular services, and that these services were
202
Similarly, in
simply part of the functioning marketplace.
203
California Dental Association v. FTC the Court struck down the
California Dental Association’s prohibition on advertising prices
and quality, reasoning that competition by its very nature involves
204
These rulings ensure that
information about price and quality.
insurance companies can offer set services, and espouses the notion
that competition is required in healthcare. It should be noted,
however, that the application of antitrust law to the healthcare
industry may not in fact strike a perfect balance between
205
competition and quality assurance.
Regulation of healthcare professionals relies on the state
police power over occupational and professional licensing.
Licensing of dentists, dental hygienists, doctors, nurses, and other
health professionals acts as a way to ensure that only qualified
professionals provide services to the public. Furthermore, licensing
acts as a barrier to entry because practicing within the scope of the
199. William Sage & Peter Hammer, Competing on Quality of Care: The Need
to Develop a Competition Policy for Health Care Markets, 32 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 1069, 1075–76 (1999).
200. 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
201. Id. at 451–53; see also Sage & Hammer, supra note 199, at 1075.
202. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 463.
203. 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
204. Id. at 767.
205. See generally Sage & Hammer, supra note 199.
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aforementioned professionals’ domains without a license results in
a criminal offense with severe sanctions.206 Since licensure of health
professionals is highly intertwined with the positions of the AMA
and ADA, these groups have tremendous influence in determining
how healthcare will be administered and who can participate.
Furthermore, they typically are responsible for much of the testing
207
and certification of professionals.
Doctors and dentists are among the most respected and
trusted professionals in the United States, but still there is a clear
problem in letting a group of professionals have sole control over
their own industry. For a comparable example, consider the
National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE), another group
of respected professionals, which decided in order to ensure
adequate quality that its members would not compete with each
208
other with regard to price. This arrangement did not hold up to
antitrust scrutiny, and the Court, in ordering them to cease this
activity, rightfully emphasized the importance of competition on
209
both price and quality. The NSPE case is useful in emphasizing
the notion that competition with regards to price does not
210
necessarily mean that all quality is lost. Perhaps more important,
the NSPE case showed that educated professionals often seek anticompetitive regulation in the name of quality, and consequently
should not be afforded excessive deference in their self-regulation.
Healthcare is a unique industry, because information deficits
211
These asymmetries and
and asymmetries persist at every level.
deficiencies result in a high degree of trust in healthcare
professionals for information, and consequently professionals have
been able to achieve very comprehensive control over healthcare
212
regulation. This control includes tight control over occupational

206. Stigler, supra note 165, at 13.
207. For example, the American Dental Association Joint Commission on
National Dental Examinations is responsible for administering the National
Dental Board Exam. See American Dental Association: Education and Testing,
http://www.ada.org/prof/ed/testing/nbde01/index.asp.
208. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 682–83 (1978).
209. Id. at 691.
210. See generally id. The NSPE unsuccessfully argued that competition on
price would lead to inadequate attention to quality work, and that such
competition would be ruinous. The United States Supreme Court disagreed, and
despite price competition in engineering services, engineers seem to be able to
build numerous quality products.
211. See Sage & Hammer, supra note 199, at 1090. For example, patients rarely
have any expertise regarding their ailments. Id.
212. Id.
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licensing and an unusually high deference being afforded to selfregulatory bodies like the ADA and AMA.213 This control strongly
reduces competition, since professionals effectively control any
new entry and require that particular standards be met in the
214
While this control does
administration of healthcare services.
ensure that only qualified professionals administer care, it is also
problematic because the medical profession views a doctor or
dentist’s choices as purely technical “and does not acknowledge the
215
These choices are
legitimacy of balancing costs and benefits.”
often wholly insulated from cost, and this standard has been
216
adopted without explicit approval or oversight from the public.
A corresponding problem with healthcare has been the fact
high costs often do not yield equally high levels of care. Perhaps
even more important, low-cost options are infrequently provided,
and consequently an unnecessarily “high” standard of care is
offered that actually ends up harming those whom it is supposed to
protect. In addition to the existence of tight professional control
over licensing, this unnecessarily high standard is a product of the
fact that most consumers of health and dental services, especially
the politically powerful, are insured by their employers and
therefore disconnected from the idea of the need for a low-cost
217
alternative. In other words, those who already have physical and
financial access to doctors and dentists under the current regime
have no reason to be sensitive to the situations of those who do not
currently have either physical or financial access. Those without
financial means typically lack strong political power, and therefore
their needs are drawn out amongst a sea of politically powerful,
complacent consumers of high-cost healthcare.
Professional organizations carrying the banners of
standardization and protection of the public often try to eliminate
competent competitors by excluding them via regulation. Such
exclusion was seen when the American Medical Association, which
218
is dominated by physicians with allopathic training, attempted to
eliminate AMA membership and state licensure of physicians with
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1090–91.
215. Clark Havighurst, How the Health Care Revolution Fell Short, 65 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 73–74 (2002).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 84, 86.
218. As opposed to “homeopathic,” “allopathic” refers to the standard method
of treating disease in which the treatment produces effects different from or
opposed to the ailment being treated. Merriam-Webster Online, http://www.mw.com/dictionary/allopathic.
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osteopathic training.219 The AMA successfully lobbied to limit
physician licensure to those who had graduated from an AMAaccredited allopathic medical school; osteopathic doctors were
consequently not able to be licensed in every state in the United
220
This sort of opposition by the AMA is also
States until 1974.
currently seen with regard to most forms of alternative medicine;
the AMA opposes the practice of alternative medicine even by
allopathic doctors, despite significant evidence that these
221
techniques can often have beneficial effects. The irony is that the
demand for alternative medicine, as measured by out-of-pocket
payments, is steadily increasing, yet payments to physicians have
222
decreased. Some recent attempts to provide alternative medicine
options include allowing licensed medical doctors to offer
alternative treatments or allowing alternative medicine
practitioners who are not doctors to practice as long as their
223
practice does not cross over into allopathic medicine.
Of course, some regulation is necessary to maintain decent
standards at a level that serves most people, but the current
regulatory regime forces high costs onto a minority that cannot
afford them and as a result is harmed because it cannot gain access
224
Clark Havighurst notes that hyper-regulation
to proper care.
occurs in the healthcare context because high level healthcare is
symbolically powerful in politics, healthcare is fairly incomeinelastic (since people with higher incomes spend a higher
percentage on healthcare), and consumers are likely to believe the
225
cost of artificially high standards will be borne by insurers. He
points out that the political power of healthcare professionals and
the political majority’s demands for artificially high standards are
likely to create a system which meets their needs but denies lower
226
This situation forces a choice
income groups access to care.
227
Thus, the
between a “Cadillac” level of care and none at all.
healthcare system ignores the importance of a low-cost alternative,

219. Gregory Dolin, Licensing Health Care Professionals: Has the United States
Outlived the Need for Medical Licensure?, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 315, 322–23
(2004).
220. Id. at 323.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 326.
223. Id. at 331.
224. Havighurst, supra note 215, at 85.
225. Id. at 85–86.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 86.
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which would enhance competition in the market and give access to
currently underserved groups.
The healthcare industry has changed due to heightened
enforcement of antitrust laws against professionals since
228
This enforcement reversed previous
approximately 1975.
professional collective behavior that restricted the ways in which
229
consumers could access healthcare. More specifically, it allowed
insurance plans to act as purchasing agents for patients and
230
Also, insurance
negotiate for reduced and consistent prices.
providers may be more effective in compelling healthcare
professionals to curb costs since they are now subject to oversight
231
An
by the plan and are therefore more mindful of price.
important result of the antitrust revolution in healthcare is the
notion that consumers may now make choices involving balancing
232
costs and types of services.
2. A History of Unmet Dental Needs. Dental care has been
identified as the most rampant unmet health need among children
233
The tragedy of this statistic is that early
in the United States.
preventative services should be relatively inexpensive, but
neglected oral disease spikes drastically in monetary cost and takes
234
significant quality of life tolls on individuals. Recent research has
also discovered associations of poor dental health with increased
risk of cardiovascular disease, stroke, and risk of pregnancies
235
Of
ending in premature labor and decreased birth weight.
course, preventive dental care would be the cheapest and least
traumatic solution, but the reality is that Alaska Natives are
already suffering from poor dental health and geographic barriers
necessitate a low-cost solution.
The need for dental professionals in Alaska Native villages is
just the tip of the iceberg, as approximately forty million
236
Americans live in areas with shortages of dental professionals.

228. Id. at 58–59.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 59.
231. Id. at 60–61.
232. Id. at 63–64.
233. Wendy E. Mouradian et al., Disparities in Children’s Oral Health and
Access to Dental Care, 284 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2625, 2625 (2000).
234. Id. at 2625–26.
235. Id. at 2626.
236. N. Karl Haden et al., Improving the Oral Health Status of All Americans:
Roles and Responsibilities of Academic Dental Institutions, 67 J. DENTAL EDUC.
563, 564 (2003).
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Dental Therapists and Dental Health Aides are not the only
legislative solution introduced to address the need for additional
dentists and lower-cost dental health professionals. For example,
the California legislature compelled the California State Board of
Dental Examiners to allow graduates of foreign dental schools to
237
Similarly, some states have
take its state licensing exam.
expanded the role of dental hygienists by loosening restrictions on
required supervision and allowing them to perform unsupervised
238
In California, the legislature has also
care in certain cases.
authorized the licensure of Registered Dental Hygienists in
Alternative Practice (RDHAP), and they are permitted to examine
239
and treat patients without dentist supervision or authorization.
Another example is found in Connecticut, a state that allows
hygienists to provide a variety of services without supervision in
certain public institutions, public health facilities, group homes, and
240
Furthermore, North Carolina allows specially trained
schools.
pediatricians to apply fluoride varnish to the teeth of children
241
under the age of three.
State dental boards are often less than enthusiastic about the
use of non-dentists in the provision of dental care to underserved
populations. For example, the South Carolina State Dental Board
opposed the South Carolina legislature, which amended its Dental
Practice Act to allow dental hygienists to perform oral prophylaxis
242
In
and apply sealants without the supervision of a dentist.
response, the State Dental Board passed an emergency resolution
preventing these unsupervised procedures by dental hygienists,
243
However, the FTC
effectively rendering that strategy useless.
successfully brought an action against the Board on unfair
competition grounds, and the Fourth Circuit dismissed the Board’s
244
interlocutory appeal, albeit on jurisdictional grounds.

237. Id. at 564.
238. Id. at 564–65.
239. Id. at 574. In other states, the hygienist must only work when a dentist is
present in the facility, and in some others, hygienists can work with less restrictive
supervision. Id.
240. Id. at 575. Haden also cites similar examples in Colorado, New Mexico,
Oregon, and Washington. Id.
241. Mouradian, supra note 233, at 2628.
242. S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry v. FTC, 455 F.3d 436, 438–39 (4th Cir. 2006).
243. Id.
244. See id. at 440, 447. The South Carolina State Dental Board argued that it
was entitled to state action immunity from antitrust laws under Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341 (1943), but the Fourth Circuit, siding with the FTC, affirmed the
district court’s holding. Id.
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One might think that, with their vehement opposition to many
non-dentist strategies to provide dental care to underserved
populations, ADA member dentists would try to serve these
populations themselves. But dental care is not covered by
Medicare, and only approximately 25% of dentists agree to treat
245
Similarly, most underserved groups
Medicaid-insured patients.
lack insurance and cannot pay high dentist rates, and most dentists
are unwilling to accept Medicare or State Childhood Health
Insurance Program (SCHIP) plans because of their low
246
These uninsured or state-insured people
reimbursement rates.
have no alternative provider to see, since dental licensing
regulations prevent non-dentists from providing any form of dental
care. Since state-issued plans are not frequently accepted—as
evidenced by the fact that only one in five children who are eligible
for Medicaid receives the preventative services for which they are
247
eligible —access to third party insurance seems to be a
determining factor in dental access. To their credit, several efforts
by dentists have enhanced access to dental care for underserved
248
populations in some cases.
The ADA itself has predicted that the ratio of dentists to the
249
general population will steadily decline, as it has for many years.
This decline could provide an opportunity for enhanced roles for
hygienists and other allied dental health personnel, including
250
Standing in the way of this expansion,
Dental Therapists.
however, are regulatory barriers to entry that do not reflect what
non-dentist dental professionals can actually do competently. If
the dental profession continues to insist that even the simplest
dental procedures can only be performed by licensed dentists, the
251
needs of underserved populations will never be fully addressed.
This stance restricts output and raises costs beyond what is
necessary, effectively preventing access of underserved populations
252
to needed dental care.

245. Haden, supra note 236, at 566.
246. Id.
247. Mouradian, supra note 233, at 2627.
248. See ADA: THE MODEL PROFESSION, supra note 18, at 2 (providing
examples of initiatives and programs conducted by individual dentists and dentist
organizations).
249. Haden, supra note 236, at 569.
250. Id. at 574.
251. Jay W. Friedman, Letter: Oral Health Care and Professional Abstinence, 95
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 190, 190 (2005).
252. Id.
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3. Who should be trusted? The ADA, state dental board, and
local dental societies are no doubt valuable in creating regulations,
because they possess an expertise that the general public and
legislators definitely do not have. But should we fully trust them?
For the most part yes, but it is important to realize that not all of
their suggestions are fully altruistic, and this self-interest is no
different than that seen in any other professional organization.
Dentists and other healthcare professionals are no doubt largely
professionally motivated to promote good health among the public,
but as professionals they also have an interest in maintaining their
economic well-being. Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind
that for most Americans, the problem of access to a dentist is not
immediate and therefore the current system works adequately for
them. They are insulated from high costs due to their insurance,
and they do not have to worry much about access or cost
253
problems. The real problem is experienced by those who cannot
afford insurance or by those that only have state insurance, for
these people are often unable to get access to the dental care that
they need.
It is easy to talk away a problem and provide theoretical
solutions, but talk without action is a non-solution. Poor dental
health has plagued the Alaska Native community since before
Alaska became a state, but the problem, though discussed, has
never been adequately addressed. Significant improvements have
indeed been made by IHS and the ADA in providing access to
dentists where before there was none, but even with some access
the problem of poor dental health persists. Despite the urging of
many dentists, the ADA has never fully addressed the poor access
suffered by underserved populations and continues to block
254
Ultimately, we
innovative dental care provision programs.
should trust dentists and the ADA for technical dental matters, but
we must also realize that professionals and professional
organizations can never fully escape self-interest. Thus, we must
give due credit to healthcare strategies suggested by and for
members of communities in need.

253. The combination of the ADA’s political power and the political power of
a population that accepts the current regime of dental licensing may also produce
the effect described by the “bootleggers and Baptists” variant of Capture Theory.
See supra Part VII.A.1.c.
254. Myron Allukian, Jr. et al., APHA Presidents Support Dental Therapists, 95
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1881, 1881 (2005).
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VIII. DENTAL THERAPISTS AS A COMPETITIVE FORCE
The introduction of Dental Therapists represents a strong
competitive force that will help keep healthcare regulators in check
and force interested parties to support what they say with action in
solving the dental health problems of Alaska Natives. It is
indisputable that Alaska Natives have the poorest dental health of
any population in the United States. Although they have access to
dental care provided by IHS, their current form of access is
inadequate to solve their dental problems. The ideal solution
would be to train more Alaska Native dentists and hire more
dentists in general to serve the Alaska Native community, but this
is a solution that could only begin to reap benefits many years
down the road. Ideally, a dentist would be put in every village to
deal with emergencies and provide continuous social influence to
change the poor hygiene and dietary habits of Alaska Natives.
The reality is that, unlike in an ideal world, there is not an
endless supply of money or professional manpower. Many
solutions are not feasible since Natives live in small,
geographically-isolated communities. Furthermore, training more
Native dentists would take eight or more years and non-Native
dentists are understandably not drawn to serving in such harsh,
unfamiliar localities. The Dental Therapist program addresses
these deficiencies via a pragmatic and realistic approach that will
drastically and quickly improve Alaska Native oral health.
Particularly for the treatment of children, Dental Therapists have
proven to be cost-effective providers of dental services, and they
have the ability to perform the routine clinical procedures
255
necessary for high-level dental health.
Beyond the positive effect that Dental Therapists will have on
the Alaska Native community, the introduction of the program will
have positive effects nationwide. Even though Dental Therapists
are limited to practice in Native villages, their introduction would
be an improvement over the monopolistic control exercised by
dentists and the ADA over many dental services. However
altruistic a group may be, it rarely makes sense to grant undue
deference to an inherently self-interested group. More specifically,
giving de facto control to the ADA over dental licensing and the
structure of dental services limits important discussion and

255. See generally Paul Riordan, Can Organized Dental Care for Children be
Both Good and Cheap?, 25 COMMUNITY DENTISTRY & ORAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 119
(1997) (explaining that Dental Therapists provide most dental care to children in
Western and Southern Australia, with outcomes equal to or better than that seen
in countries that only provide care with dentists).
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solutions for underserved populations. By insisting that certain
routine services can only be performed by dentists despite the
reality that there are not enough dentists willing to serve uninsured
or state-insured people, the ADA has continually shown that its
strategies are insufficient for providing access to those with limited
resources.
The ADA is a politically and economically powerful group. It
enjoys a significant moral high ground since the dental profession is
highly regarded and has an inherently humanitarian mission.
Furthermore, its arguments for quality and high standards are
given more credibility than those of other groups since dental and
health services are industries where a certain minimal level of
quality is an unarguable necessity. This combination allowed the
ADA to capture the market for dental licensing to the extent that
it has completely excluded competition for dental services. It has
successfully silenced competitive voices by exercising its private
association’s monopolistic mindset via governmental enforcement
of licensing. However, in Alaska it became apparent to the Native
population that such a dental licensing regime stood more as a
barrier to care than an assurance of quality.
The creation of the Dental Therapist program is not surprising
given the gradual shift toward less restrictive regulation in United
States industries and the enforcement of antitrust laws against
256
healthcare professionals. This trend is representative of changing
attitudes toward regulation and the recognition that the inherent
self-interest of professional organizations and industries should be
acknowledged when assessing their proposed regulatory schemes.
In healthcare specifically, there is a trend toward creating a
structure with more consumer choice and allowing prices to be
257
The consumer can either be the
more of a factor than before.
end user of a service or an insurance company, both of which can
make decisions on quality and price.
By exercising its political and legislative power in response to
an unmet need, the IHS has proven that competitive forces can
258
In creating a new license, IHS
come from unsuspected entities.
has the power to end the market capture of the dental market by
the ADA and dentists. This agency action was therefore crucial in
effecting a change that individuals or collections of individuals have
otherwise not been able to achieve.

256. Mouradian et al., supra note 233, at 2627–30.
257. Havighurst, supra note 215, at 63–64.
258. See, e.g., Sage & Hammer, supra note 199, at 1094–95 (noting the role of
“competition as a vehicle to restructure Medicare and medical markets”).
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Another reason that the IHS was in a prime position to create
this change is that the IHS and Tribal Consortiums do not weigh
the same risks that a private insurer would. That is, the situation in
Alaska is graver than that of the average employed middle class
American worker. Thus, the standard of care demanded by the
ADA cannot properly account for risk and price in this graver
situation. Indeed, this standard of care minimizes cost-sensitive
product differentiation, or even the existence of a product for those
without access. One result of the creation of a different—and not
inferior—standard of care is that the ADA will be forced to
address needs that its current preferred dental care administering
system does not satisfy.
The other great triumph arising from the establishment of a
Dental Therapist program is that it is a behaviorally and culturally
sensitive solution. Even if more non-Native dentists were available
to the Native population, Native behavior would probably not be
changed. Therefore, the ability of the Dental Therapist program to
train Natives themselves to provide dental care is invaluable
259
because the problem cannot be solved by enhancing access alone.
The ADA certainly recognized the importance of a culturally and
behaviorally sensitive solution in its suggestion to train more
Native dentists, but it did not acknowledge the fact that so few
Natives graduate from college that the pool of potential Native
dentists makes the ADA’s suggested approach currently
unattainable.
The Dental Therapist program is creating dental health
professionals with community and cultural ties that can more
effectively change the behavioral problems associated with poor
dental health among Alaska Natives. By changing behavior
through a culturally sensitive route, the quality of life of Alaska
Natives, as well as their attitude toward dental health, will improve.
Consequently, it is far more likely that Alaska Natives will then be
inspired to pursue dentistry as a career goal. Thus, the Dental
Therapist program will in fact prove essential in achieving the
ADA’s suggested goal of training more Native dentists.
IX. CONCLUSION
The oral health of Alaska Natives is and has been extremely
poor since Alaska became a state, but the introduction of Dental

259. See Barak D. Richman, Behavioral Economics and Health Policy:
Understanding Medicaid’s Failure, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 705 (2005) (arguing that
patient behavior must be a central factor in formulating sensible public healthcare
policy).
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Therapists via a unique federal license stands to vastly improve the
situation. Similar improvements have been seen in New Zealand,
Canada, and many other countries, all of which utilize some form
of a Dental Therapist professional program. However, the ADA is
opposed to this type of dental health professional, because they
perform some of the same procedures that licensed dentists
currently do. This opposition is tightly linked to the inherent selfinterest of dentists in being the only source for dental services.
This self-interest results in the neglect of underserved portions of
the market. Dental Therapists are a viable low-cost alternative to
dentists in offering access to dental care.
As a result of the creation of a non-dentist low-cost
alternative, the ADA will have to address segments of the
American population that it has been inadequately serving.
Furthermore, the creation of Dental Therapists in Alaska is
consistent with the trend toward less restrictive regulation in most
American industries, and hopefully foreshadows the future
development of other low-cost alternatives to current high-cost
healthcare options. Ultimately, Dental Therapists will improve
both the oral health of Alaska Natives and improve the overall
market for dental healthcare by forcing a much needed form of
competition back into the market.

